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SEC RULE 14e-3 IN THE WAKE OF UNITED STATES v.
O'HAGAN: PROPER PROPHYLACTIC SCOPE AND THE
FUTURE OF WAREHOUSING
Not surprisingly, the Supreme Court's June 25, 1997, decision
in United States v. O'Hagan,' concerning the controversial legal
topics of insider trading and securities regulation,2 elicited a
wide variety of reactions.3 Somewhat unexpected, however, was
the legal community's focus on the' Court's ruling in regard to
SEC Rule 10b-5 and the judicially-created "misappropriation

1. 521 U.S. 642 (1997). In O'Hagan, the Supreme Court decided the broad legal
issues involved and remanded the case to the Eighth Circuit for a ruling consistent
with the guidelines established by the Court. See United States v. O'Hagan, 139
F.3d 641 (8th Cir. 1998), on remand from 521 U.S. 642 (1997).
2. One commentator, noting that "[h]ardly a month goes by without an article on
insider trading appearing in one legal journal or another," further points out that
the topic is controversial because so many issues remain open to a "great deal of debate." Paula J. Dalley, From Horse Trading to Insider Trading: The Historical Antecedents of the Insider Trading Debate, 39 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1289, 1293 (1998).
3. See, e.g., Richard W. Painter et al., Don't Ask, Just Tell: Insider Trading After
United States v. O'Hagan, 84 VA. L. REV. 153, 228 (1998) ("The misappropriation
theory is appealing precisely because it comports with our collective sense of moral
approbation of people breaching a position of trust for their personal and financial
advantage"); Harvey L. Pitt et al., Misappropriating Certainty from the Securities
Markets: A Practitioner'sPrimer on the O'Hagan Decision, 2 N.C. BANKING INST. 71,
71 (1998) ("The impact of this outcome . . . extends far beyond the fortunes of one
defendant. The manner in which the government prevailed in O'Hagan will have
significant day-to-day implications ...
."); Carol B. Swanson, Reinventing Insider
Trading: The Supreme Court Misappropriates the MisappropriationTheory, 32 WAKE
FOREST L. REV. 1157, 1158 (1997) ("By adding another flawed piece to the already
shaky structure of insider trading case precedent, the Court risks total collapse.");
Dominic Bencivenga, The Right Set of Facts: 'O'Hagan' Court Affirms SEC Rule-Making Power, N.Y.L.J., July 3, 1997, at 3 ("'[The decision is] going to have far ranging
ramifications in terms of future power given to the SEC.') (quoting securities lawyer
Harvey L. Pitt); Michael Prozan, Supreme Court Tries to Clear Up the Ins and Outs
of Insider Trading, Bus. J.-SAN JOSE, Oct. 6, 1997, at 58 ("Lawyers may disagree
over the technicalities of ...
O'Hagan, but it benefits everyone by defining certain
areas of insider trading."); Anne Kates Smith, Betrayers of Trust: Who's An Inside
Trader, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., July 7, 1997, at 72, 75 ("he Supreme Court's
decision is a powerful boost to the government's enforcement power.. ...

1853

1854

WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 40:1853

theory" of insider trading liability.4 Although the predecision

circuit split 5 concerning the misappropriation theory's validity as
a foundation for SEC Rule 10b-5 securities fraud liability certainly justified the significant attention paid to it within both
the Court's analysis and the resulting legal commentary, an
unfortunate repercussion of the attention seems to be that an
4. See O'Hagan, 521 U.S. at 650-66 (ruling that criminal liability under section
10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 may be predicated upon the "misappropriation theory" of inside information; as such, the SEC may prohibit trading practices involving confidential information even though the transactions may lack the
traditional direct breach of fiduciary duty required as an element of common-law
fraud). As a result of the O'Hagan decision, "'fraud on the source' is now the operative standard, and 'fraud on the trading partner' need not be proved." John C.
Coffee, Jr., Outsider Trading After O'Hagan, CORP. COUNS., Dec. 1997, at 6; see also
Elliot J. Weiss, United States v. O Hagan: PragmatismReturns to the Law of Insider
Trading, 23 J. CORP. L. 395, 423 (1998) ('The misappropriation theory protects the
integrity of the securities markets against abuses by 'outsiders' to a corporation who
have access to confidential information that will affect that corporation's security
price when revealed, but who owe no fiduciary or other duty to that corporation's
shareholders." (emphasis added) (citing Petitioner's Brief, United States v. O'Hagan,
521 U.S. 642 (1997) (No. 96-842), available in 1997 WL 86306)).
For a history of the development of the misappropriation theory of insider trading liability, see David Cowan Bayne, S.J., Insider Trading: The Demise of the Misappropriation Theory--and Thereafter, 41 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 625 (1997); Painter et
al., supra note 3; Steven R. Salbu, The MisappropriationTheory of Insider Trading:
A Legal, Economic, and Ethical Analysis, 15 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POLY 223 (1992);
Timothy Sullivan, Comment, We're Still Against Fraud, Aren't We? United States v.
O'Hagan: Trimming the Oak in the Wrong Season, 71 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 197 (1997).
5. Prior to the O'Hagan decision, several courts of appeals had upheld the validity of applying the misappropriation theory of insider trading to Rule 10b-5 violations, including the Second Circuit, see United States v. Chestman, 947 F.2d 551,
566-67 (2d Cir. 1991) (en banc), the Third Circuit, see Rothberg v. Rosenbloom, 771
F.2d 818, 822-23 (3d Cir. 1985), the Seventh Circuit, see SEC v. Maio, 51 F.3d 623,
630-34 (7th Cir. 1995), the Ninth Circuit, see SEC v. Clark, 915 F.2d 439, 442-53
(9th Cir. 1990), and the Tenth Circuit, see SEC v. Peters, 978 F.2d 1162, 1165-67
(10th Cir. 1992). In contrast, its validity had been rejected in the Eighth Circuit, see
United States v. O'Hagan, 92 F.3d 612, 615-22 (8th Cir. 1996), rev'd, 521 U.S. 642
(1997), and the Fourth Circuit, see United States v. Bryan, 58 F.3d 933, 943-60 (4th
Cir. 1995).
For an analysis of the rationale underlying the Fourth and Eighth Circuits' decisions to reject the misappropriation theory, see Swanson, supra note 3, at 1175-91,
Timothy J. Horman, Comment, In Defense of United States v. Bryan: Why the Misappropriation Theory Is Indefensible, 64 FORDHAM L. REv. 2455, 2485-91 (1996) (discussing the Fourth Circuit's rejection of the misappropriation theory), and Sean P.
Leuba, Note, The Fourth Circuit Breaks Ranks in United States v. Bryan: Finally, A
Repudiation of the Misappropriation Theory, 53 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 1143, 1198207 (1996) (same).
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equally important aspect of the O'Hagan decision has received
inadequate treatment.6
Specifically, legal scholars have neglected the Court's ruling
with respect to SEC Rule 14e-3 and its prohibition against
fraudulent trading in connection with a tender offer.' Although
the O'Hagan Court's brief analysis of Rule 14e-3' settled several
legal questions surrounding the rule's scope and validity,9 signif-

6. This aspect of the O'Hagan decision--concerning SEC Rule 14e-3-has not,
however, been neglected by all legal commentators. See, e.g., High Court Insider
Trading Decision May Leave Question, WALL ST. LE'TER, June 30, 1997, available in

1997 WL 12203150; Joseph McLaughlin, O'Hagan: Some Answers, More Questions,
N.Y.L.J., July 1, 1997, at 1.
7. Interestingly, the term "tender offer" is neither defined within the Williams
Act, Pub. L. No. 90-439, 82 Stat. 454, 457 (1968) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C.
§ 78n(e) (1994)), nor within any of the SEC's rules promulgated thereunder. See
Dale A. Oesterle, The Rise and Fall of Street Sweep Takeovers, 1989 DUKE L.J. 202,
217-33. The courts typically define a "tender offer" broadly, aided by an eight-factor
test developed in Wellman v. Dickinson, 475 F. Supp. 783, 823-24 (S.D.N.Y. 1979)
(holding a tender offer made without a preacquisition filing to be a violation of the
Williams Act).
Despite the relative ambiguity, a useful working definition of a "tender offer" is
any "public invitation to . . . shareholders of the target corporation to tender their
shares." ROBERT W. HAMILTON, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CORPORATIONS 1139 (5th
ed. 1994). Initiation of a tender offer is predicated largely on a tactical consideration
that stems from the desire of the bidder to gain effective control over a target corporation. See LEWIS D. SOLOMON & ALAN R. PALMITER, CORPORATIONS: EXAMPLES AND
EXPLANATIONS § 39.2, at 580-81 (2d ed. 1994). This consideration has been generalized as follows:
Seeking control through open market purchases is problematic - rarely
will enough shareholders be willing to sell at market for a bidder to acquire a control block. A tender offer forces the question. The bidder
greatly increases its chances of acquiring a control block by publicly offering to buy a specified number of tendered shares during a specified period at a premium over prevailing market prices. A tender offer operates
much like a retailer's "week-end clearance sale at never again prices."
Id. at 580.
8. See O'Hagan, 521 U.S. at 666-77.
9. With respect to Rule 14e-3, the Court in O'Hagan answered, in the affirmative, the question of whether the SEC possessed sufficient authority to promulgate
Rule 14e-3, and additionally, whether the SEC could interpret the rule as prohibiting the type of tender offer securities trading activity presented by the particular
facts of the case. See id.; see also Richard M. Phillips & Michael B. Avon, The Supreme Court's Decision in O'Hagan: A Choice of Judicial Pragmatism over Ideology,
in SECURITIES ENFORCEMENT INSTITUTE, A PRACTICAL GUIDE TO INVESTIGATION, SET-

TLEMENT & LITIGATION 239, 239-60 (PLI Corp. Law & Practice Course Handbook
Series No. B4-7240, 1997) (discussing the background of the O'Hagan decision, as
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icant questions nonetheless remain unanswered, if not unaddressed. This Note focuses on the most significant unresolved
question surrounding Rule 14e-3 in the wake of the O'Hagan
decision: What is the rule's legitimate scope? This Note's analysis of the legitimate scope of Rule 14e-3 arises not out of anything the Court settled in O'Hagan, but rather from something
specifically left unresolved by the Court-the applicability of
Rule 14e-3 to the practice of "warehousing." °
Before analyzing the practice of warehousing, this Note reviews Rule 14e-3 and the legal context of the O'Hagan controversy. The first section also discusses the legislative history of
Rule 14e-3, as well as the legal treatment of the rule. Specifically, this exercise involves an effort to discern the legitimate scope
of Rule 14e-3, in light of the Court's classification of Rule 14e-3
as a prophylactic rule. In addition, the first section discusses the
Court's limiting language in O'Hagan, particularly in relation to
the misappropriation theory and its potential application to Rule
14e-3. To facilitate a more lucid understanding of the implications of the O'Hagan decision, this discussion also provides a
brief overview of the factual setting of the case. The first section
concludes with an examination of the O'Hagan Court's formulation of the term "misappropriation" as presented in its analysis
of Rule 10b-5.
The second section of this Note moves to a detailed examination of the practice of warehousing, including an explanation of
the value of testing the boundaries of Rule 14e-3 with the specific practice of warehousing. The second section delineates the
relationship of warehousing to insider trading generally, and the
trading activity in O'Hagan specifically, through the use of a
warehousing model that this Note constructs and employs in
several scenarios. This model serves to highlight the significant
distinctions between the activity described by the Court in
O'Hagan and the practice of warehousing. With these distinctions revealed, this Note conducts a more detailed comparison

well as the implications of the Court's acceptance of Rule 14e-3).
10. See O'Hagan, 521 U.S. at 672 n.17 ("We leave for another day . . . the legiti"). For a basic explanation of
macy of Rule 14e-3(a) as applied to 'warehousing' ....
the practice of warehousing, see infra notes 46-57 and accompanying text.
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between misappropriation and warehousing, focusing upon the
nature and the extent of both deception and nondisclosure within the two tender offer trading activities.
The third section directly addresses the issue of the legitimate
scope of Rule 14e-3. By reexamining section 14(e) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, with a focus upon its authorization
mandate, and the twin concerns of fairness and market integrity, this Note shows that the policy rationale undergirding
section 14(e) does not carry over to the nature and extent of
deception and nondisclosure exhibited within the practice of
warehousing, and thus the legitimate prophylactic scope of Rule
14e-3 should not be expanded to warehousing.
Finally, the fourth section of this Note assesses the proper
role of both the judiciary and Congress within the debate over
insider trading regulation. This Note concludes that an expansion of the current framework of insider trading prohibition is
an act best reserved for the legislature, where the significant
public policy arguments may be debated and analyzed in a manner more consistent with the separation of powers doctrine.
SEC RULE 14e-3
Background and History
The SEC implemented Rule 14e-3 under the authority of section 14(e) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 ("Exchange
Act"), as a response to the perceived growth of problems of

11. Section 14(e) originally was enacted in 1968, as part of the Williams Act, Pub.
L. No. 90-439, 82 Stat. 454, 457 (1968) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78n(e)),
with the intention of providing protection to shareholders involved in a tender offer.
See Roger J. Dennis, This Little Piggy Went to Market: The Regulation of Risk Arbitrage after Boesky, 52 ALB. L. REV. 841, 874 (1988); William J. Cook, Note, From
Insider Trading to Unfair Trading: Chestman II and Rule 14e-3, 22 STETSON L. REv.
171, 194-98 (1992); Roberta S. Karmel, Authority for the Tender Offer Rules,
ANDREWS SEC. & COmiODITIES LITIG. REP., Feb. 12, 1997, at 3. In 1970, Congress
added section 14(e)'s grant of rulemaking authority to the SEC in response to "increasingly sophisticated and rapidly changing techniques used in corporate takeovers
and tender offers." Cook, supra, at 196. The rulemaking addition to section 14(e)
reads: "The Commission shall, for the purposes of this subsection, by rules and regulations define, and prescribe means reasonably designed to prevent, such acts and
practices as are fraudulent, deceptive, or manipulative." 15 U.S.C. § 78n(e).
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securities fraud within the specific realm of the tender offer.12
Prior to the Supreme Court's decision in O'Hagan,the Eighth Circuit discredited Rule 14e-3, arguing that the SEC had exceeded

12. Applicable only in the specific context of a tender offer, the rule reads, in
part:
[Ilt shall constitute a fraudulent, deceptive or manipulative act or practice within the meaning of section 14(e) of the Act for any other person
who is in possession of material information relating to such tender offer
which information he knows or has reason to know is nonpublic and
which he knows or has reason to know has been acquired directly or indirectly from:
(1) The offering person,
(2) The issuer of the securities sought or to be sought by such tender offer, or
(3) Any officer, director, partner or employee or any other person
acting on behalf of the offering person or such issuer, to purchase or sell . . .any of such securities . . .unless within a reasonable time prior to any purchase or sale such information and
its sources are publicly disclosed by press release or otherwise.
17 C.F.R. § 240.14e-3(a) (1998).
For a brief recitation of the legislative history of section 14(e), with an eye toward its compatibility with Rule 14e-3, see Laura Ryan, Comment, Rule 14e-3"s Disclose-or-Abstain Rule and Its Validity Under Section 14(e), 60 U. CIN. L. REV. 449,
453-65 (1991). Significantly, the SEC adopted Rule 14e-3 in 1980 based upon the
Commission's belief that Congress intended section 14(e) to encompass a realm of
tender offer trading activity "well beyond a bidder's duty of disclosure to target
shareholders." Michael T. Raymond, Validity Challenges to SEC Rule 14e-3, 23 J.
MARSHALL L. REV. 305, 309-10 (1990). The SEC's interpretation is debatable in light
of the "noticeabl[e] absen[ce]" of an expressed congressional intent within the legislative history of section 14(e) "to impose duties upon persons other than bidders and
those opposing a tender offer." Id. at 309 (emphasis added); see Samuel N. Allen,
Note, The Scope of Disclosure Duty under SEC Rule 14e-3, 38 WASH. & LEE L. REV.
1055, 1062-63 (1981); Cook, supra note 11, at 194-98; see also Michael J. Voves,
Comment, United States v. O'Hagan: Improperly Incorporating Common Law Fiduciary Obligations into § 14(e) of the Securities Exchange Act, 81 MINN. L. REv. 1015,
1035 (1997) ("Congress narrowly tailored the Williams Act's provisions to regulate
disclosure of information between persons making tender offers and target companies."); Karmel, supra note 11, at 3 ("[Tlhe purpose of the [Williams Act] was to
protect investors when confronted with an offer to purchase their shares . . .
through disclosure ...
").
For an analysis and evaluation of the validity and wisdom of Rule 14e-3, see
generally Samuel H. Gruenbaum, The New Disclose or Abstain From Trading Rule:
Has the SEC Gone Too Far?, 4 CoRp. L. REv. 350 (1981) (concluding that Rule 14e3 deserves close scrutiny from the courts), and Mary F. Hill, Note, Trading on Material, Nonpublic Information Under Rule 14e-3, 49 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 539 (1981)
(proposing the need for a separate analysis of sections 10(b) and 14(e) in the wake
of the adoption of Rule 14e-3 and Chiarellav. United States, 445 U.S. 222 (1980)).
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its permissible rulemaking authority as framed by section 14(e)
of the Exchange Act.' 3 The Eighth Circuit focused its analysis on
the scope of authority intended by Congress in its grant of power
to the SEC-within section 14(e)-to "define, and prescribe
means reasonably designed to prevent" fraudulent acts in connection with a tender offer. 4 In particular, the court questioned
the legitimacy of Rule 14e-3 in light of the absence of any requirement that a prohibited "fraudulent" act involve an actual
breach of fiduciary duty. 5 On the basis of this very argument,
the Eighth Circuit reversed the criminal convictions against
James O'Hagan. 1 6 The Supreme Court, however, did not agree

with the Eighth Circuit,17 and ruled that the SEC had not exceeded its rulemaking authority in adopting Rule 14e-3 or in
13. See United States v. O'Hagan, 92 F.3d 612, 622-27 (8th Cir. 1996), rev'd, 521
U.S. 642 (1997). Other decisions assessing the validity of Rule 14e-3 differ markedly.
See generally Ryan, supra note 12, at 474-81 (examining a variety of caselaw assessing the validity of Rule 14e-3).
14. 15 U.S.C. § 78n(e). As such, this Note focuses primarily on the legal aspects
of the SEC's rulemaking authority. The related topic of SEC rulemaking and regulation as applied to public policy theory, although not essential to an understanding of
the legal arguments presented herein, involves many similar issues and raises significant questions in the field of securities regulation and enforcement. See generally
Donald C. Langevoort, The SEC as a Bureaucracy: Public Choice, Institutional
Rhetoric, and the Process of Policy Formation, 47 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 527 (1990)
(concluding that an understanding of policy formation within any administrative
agency is important because one can determine the proper amount of deference to
give to the agency's statutory interpretation, and questioning conventions may create
a positive impetus for change within the agency); William R. McLucas et al., Common Sense, Flexibility, and Enforcement of the Federal Securities Laws, 51 Bus. LAW.
1221 (1996) (reviewing the SEC's enforcement actions and providing criteria to judge
the SEC's effectiveness).
15. See O'Hagan, 92 F.3d at 622-27. O'Hagan argued that the grant of authority
under section 14(e) limits the SEC to creating rules that prohibit only those activities that are in and of themselves fraudulent. See id. at 623-24. Under traditional
insider trading law, only those persons "inside" the corporation, such as corporate
officers and directors, could be subject to fraud through insider trading. See generally
Using High Court Guidelines, Eighth Circuit Reverses Insider Ruling, ANDREwS DERivATwES LiTiG. REP., May 7, 1998, at 11-12 [hereinafter Using High Court
Guidelines] (discussing the Eighth Circuit's treatment of O'Hagan on remand).
16. See O'Hagan, 92 F.3d at 627; see also Swanson, supra note 3, at 1182-91 (discussing the Eighth Circuit's analysis and decision in O'Hagan).
17. See United States v. O'Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 676 (1997). Although the Court
overruled the Eighth Circuit's decision as it pertained to the validity of Rule 14e-3,
one commentator described the Court's ultimate assessment of Rule 14e-3 as a
"somewhat grudging affirmance." McLaughlin, supra note 6, at 1.
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applying the rule to the type of activity that was presented in
18 thus seemingly placing to rest the legal battle over
O'Hagan,
the legitimacy of Rule 14e-3.19
The remainder of this Note argues otherwise, showing that
the limits to Rule 14e-3's legitimate scope are still very much in
question. By employing the practice of warehousing as a foundation for the construction of a basic model to illustrate the possibility that trading on the basis of nonpublic information in the
context of a tender offer, and in the absence of a breach of fiduciary duty, in fact legitimately may fall outside of the permissible scope of post-O'Hagan Rule 14e-3, this Note attempts to
clarify the boundaries of Rule 14e-3.
Scope of Rule 14e-3 Post O'Hagan
In the opening paragraph of the O'Hagan decision, Justice
Ginsburg, writing the opinion of the Court, 0 framed one of the
two "prime questions" posed by the O'Hagan appeal: "Did the
[SEC] exceed its rulemaking authority by adopting Rule 14e3(a), which proscribes trading on undisclosed information in the
tender offer setting, even in the absence of a duty to disclose?"2 1

18. See O'Hagan, 521 U.S. at 666-77, 692-700 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part). See generally Phillips & Avon, supra note 9, at
257-59 (describing the Court's acceptance of Rule 14e-3 in O'Hagan).
19. The Court's decision has spared the government the need, "in marginal cases,
to conduct the mental contortions necessary to 'uncover' a duty that has been
breached." Pitt et al., supra note 3, at 75. In the process of formulating the
O'Hagan decision, however, some have argued that the Court ignored the fundamental principles of administrative law. See E. Livingston B. Haskell, Note, "Disclose-orAbstain" Without Restraint: The Supreme Court Misses the Mark on Rule 14e-3 in
United States v. O'Hagan, 55 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 199, 225-30 (1998) (asserting
that the Supreme Court ignored a fundamental rule of administrative law by evaluating the validity of Rule 14e-3 on a basis other than the one that the SEC provided at the time of the original rulemaking action),
20. Three Justices disagreed with the majority opinion. Justices Scalia and Thomas dissented from Court's opinion concerning Rule 10b-5. See O'Hagan, 521 U.S. at
679 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part), 680 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part). The Chief Justice and Justice
Thomas rejected the Court's Rule 14e-3 opinion. See id. at 680 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part)
21. Id. at 647. The Court framed the other "prime question"-outside the scope of
this Note-as follows: "Is a person who trades in securities for personal profit, using
confidential information misappropriated in breach of a fiduciary duty to the source
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In the process of addressing this question, the Court first signaled a potential willingness to limit the breadth of its Rule
14e-3 holding in O'Hagan: "Our answer to... [this] question,... viewed in the context of this case, [is] no."22
To understand the potential significance of this limitation, it
is first essential to understand the context in which the
O'Hagan Court held that Rule 14e-3 properly applied.2" James
O'Hagan was a lawyer with a firm retained as counsel by a
large corporation in anticipation of a potential takeover by
means of a tender offer.' Although not involved personally in
this representation, O'Hagan learned 'of the client's plans to
initiate a takeover bid for another corporation, and proceeded to
use this knowledge to acquire both common stock and call options of the potential target corporation.2" Within this specific
context, the Court focused its analysis and final determination
on the fact that the corporation from which O'Hagan had indirectly acquired information regarding the potential tender offer
had no knowledge of,26 and had not consented to, 27 O'Hagan's
of the information, guilty of violating § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5? Id.
22. Id. (emphasis added). Addressing this issue later in the opinion, the Court
reiterated this potential limitation, stating that "[wie hold that the [SEC], in this
regard and to the extent relevant to this case, did not exceed its authority." Id. at
667 (emphases added). The practical effect of the Court's limiting language, which
was unnecessary in reaching the specific determination settled in O'Hagan, is to
create, at a minimum, some degree of latitude for the Court's future assessments of
the legitimacy of Rule 14e-3. Even further, the O'Hagan decision indicates a cognizable level of weariness concerning the legitimacy of Rule 14e-3 as applied to situations distinct from O'Hagan. See generally Swanson, supra note 3, at 1210 (stating
that the Court's "lukewarm endorsement of Rule 14e-3(a) transforms a relatively
clear and efficient enforcement tool into another question mark to be resolved in a
different case").
23. For a more in-depth examination of the facts of O'Hagan, see Bencivenga, supra note 3, at 5; Prozan, supra note 3, at 58; High Court Insider Trading Decision
May Leave Question, supra note 6.
24. See O'Hagan, 521 U.S. at 647. Grand Metropolitan PLC ("Grand Met") was
the bidding corporation. For another insider trading case arising out of Grand Met's
bid, see SEC v. Falbo, 14 F. Supp. 2d 508, 513 (S.D.N.Y. 1998).
25. See O'Hagan, 521 U.S. at 647. The Pillsbury Corporation was the target corporation. Directly from his series of Pillsbury trades, James O'Hagan took away over
$4.3 million worth of "dough." See id. at 648.
26. See id. at 667-77 (focusing on the problematic nature of securities trading
based upon nonpublic information in situations in which the source of the information is unaware that such information has become public or "leaked").
27. See id. (discussing the role of obtaining the consent of one's source within the
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trading.28 O'Hagan's failure to notify the corporate source of his
trading plans was especially significant in this context. Although
O'Hagan's lack of any personal association with the target corporation put into question the formation of a fiduciary duty traditionally required as an element of fraud within the realm of
insider trading, 29 the Court's classification of Rule 14e-3 as a
"prophylactic measure""0 had the effect of generating an area,
outside that of traditional or common-law fraud, in which Rule
14e-3 nonetheless may operate permissibly.31 As such, by applying Rule 14e-3 to the specific facts of the O'Hagan case, the
Court stated that "insofar as it serves to prevent the type of
misappropriation charged against O'Hagan, Rule 14e-3(a) is a
proper exercise of the [SEC's] prophylactic power under [section]
14(e)."32
From this statement, it is clear that although the Court recognized that misappropriation of nonpublic information may fall
context of inside information-based trading); see also Coffee, supra note 4, at 6 (referring to the "consent to use" analysis in O'Hagan as the "linchpin of [the majority
opinion's] theory of deception").
28. As evidenced in O'Hagan, the misappropriation of inside information frequently
involves both Rule 10b-5 and Rule 14e-3. Nearly half of the SEC's "misappropriation" cases are set within the context of a tender offer, thus implicating both rules.
See Smith, supra note 3, at 75 (noting that almost half of the SEC's misappropriation cases also address the tender offer rule).
29. See supra notes 15-16 and accompanying text.
30. See O'Hagan, 521 U.S. at 672-73 ("A prophylactic measure, because its mission
is to prevent, typically encompasses more than the core activity prohibited." (emphasis added)). Courts also have justified the extension of Rule 14e-3 to nonfraudulent
activity based on the difficulties associated with proving actual fraud within the context of tender offer trading activity. See, e.g., id. at 673-74; SEC v. Maio, 51 F.3d
623, 635 (7th Cir. 1995); SEC v. Peters, 978 F.2d 1162, 1167 (10th Cir. 1992); United States v. Chestman, 947 F.2d 551, 559 (2d Cir. 1991); see also Voves, supra note
12, at 1030-31 (noting cases interpreting the validity of Rule 14e-3).
31. The O'Hagan Court addressed the "latitude" surrounding the legitimate scope
of Rule 14e-3, holding that "under [section] 14(e), the [SEC] may prohibit acts, not
themselves fraudulent under the common law ... if the prohibition is 'reasonably
designed to prevent ... acts and practices [that] are fraudulent." O'Hagan, 521
U.S. at 673.
32. O'Hagan, 521 U.S. at 676 (emphasis added). Several commentators have noted
that the "extreme" and "egregious" facts of the O'Hagan case, such as O'Hagan's previous embezzlement from client trust funds, may well have driven the Court's decision to allow the use of the misappropriation theory in this case. But see, e.g., Pitt
et al., supra note 3, at 72 (noting that O'Hagan has implications beyond the narrow
facts of the case).
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outside the area of traditional fraudulent fiduciary breach, it
also acknowledged that misappropriation nonetheless may fall
within the prophylactic, and thus legitimate, scope of Rule 14e3.33 By focusing its analysis and decision regarding the prophylactic scope of Rule 14e-3 on the specific facts implicated in
O'Hagan, the Court apparently limited, at least for the present
time, its holding as to the validity of applying Rule 14e-3 to situations involving either traditional breach of fiduciary duty and
fraud or a "misappropriation" of inside information regarding a
tender offer.34
Rule 14e-3 and Misappropriation
The Court's use of the term "misappropriation" in describing
the context in which Rule 14e-3 may be applied legitimately cannot, within the O'Hagandecision, be considered a vague or shifting term of art. In its discussion of James O'Hagan's Rule 10b-5
violations,35 the Court analyzed, and ultimately approved, the
"misappropriation theory" of insider trading liability.36 In the

33. The Court's specific use of the term "misappropriation in this instance, see
O'Hagan, 521 U.S. at 676, hardly can be considered insignificant within the Rule
14e-3 discussion, in light of the extensive analysis of that very term within the
Court's Rule lOb-5 analysis. See id. at 650-66; see also infra notes 35-41 and accompanying text (discussing use of the term 'misappropriation" within the O'Hagan
opinion's Rule 10b-5 and Rule 14e-3 analysis).
34. The Court's limitation contrasts sharply with the SEC's position regarding the
legitimacy of Rule 14e-3 as applied to warehousing, as well as to other
nonfraudulent tender offer activity based on nonpublic information: "The prohibitions
of Rule 14e-3 apply even if the person charged with a violation does not owe a fiduciary or other duty to the issuer or its shareholders and even if no prohibition
against misappropriationhas been violated.'" RALPH C. FERRARA ET AL., FERRARA ON
INSIDER TRADING AND THE WALL § 2.041], at 2-40.7 n.4 (1998) (emphasis added)

(quoting SEC Chairman David Ruder, Remarks Before the National Investor Relations Institute 7 (Nov. 11, 1987)).

35. Rule 10b-5 operates as a general antifraud provision within the securities law
framework. See John F. Olson et al., Report of the Task Force on Regulation of Insider Trading, Part I: Regulation Under the Antifraud Provisions of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934, 41 BUS. LAW. 223, 230 (1985). In comparison to Rule 14e-3,
Rule 10b-5 is more general in that it applies to the purchase or sale of any security,
as opposed to Rule 14e-3's specific and exclusive applicability to the tender offer setting. See generally THOT*AS LEE HAZEN, THE LAW OF SECURMTEs REGULATION § 13.2,

at 760-69 (3d ed. 1996) (presenting a brief overview of Rule 10b-5).
36. See O'Hagan, 521 U.S. at 650-53 (1997) ("In lieu of premising liability on a
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process of doing so, the Court articulated specific elements that,
when pieced together, provide a definition of "misappropriation"
within the context of securities regulation.
First, the Court required deception.38 Further, the Court appeared to link the concept of deception within misappropriation
to nondisclosure.9 According to the O'Hagan Court, deceptive
nondisclosure, in this context, "constitutes fraud akin to embezzlement" in which "[a] fiduciary. . . '[pretends] loyalty to the
principal while secretly converting the principal's information for
personal gain.'"4 Finally, and perhaps most significantly, the
Court rather narrowly limited liability under the misappropriation theory to nondisclosure by the trader to the source of the
nonpublic information.4 ' Pieced together, then, the ensuing
O'Hagan definition of misappropriation involves (1) deception;
(2) through nondisclosure; (3) to the source of the acquired
nonpublic information.

fiduciary relationship between company insider and purchaser or seller of the company's stock, the misappropriation theory premises liability on a fiduciary-turned-trader's deception of those who entrusted him with access to confidential information.");
see also id. at 650-66 (analyzing the development of the misappropriation theory and
applying it to the facts of the O'Hagan case).
37. See id. at 650-66. One must keep in mind, of course, that O'Hagan's analysis
of the necessary elements of a legitimately-prohibited act of misappropriation pertains specifically to Rule 10b-5. As a result, this analysis does not necessarily carry
over to Rule 14e-3, particularly in light of the deliberate degree of breadth provided
in Rule 14e-3-a breadth not found in Rule 10b-5.
This Note in fact argues that the use of the specific term "misappropriation"
within the Court's Rule 14e-3 assessment of James O'Hagan's activities strongly suggests that a similar analysis will hold under both rules. That these elements apply
with equal force to both Rule 10b-5 and Rule 14e-3 is "the most logical explanation
for why the Court indicated in a footnote that Rule 14e-3 might not apply to warehousing transactions." Coffee, supra note 4, at 17; see also Voves, supra note 12, at
1045-46 (discussing the notion of a "misappropriation theory" of Rule 14e-3 liability).
38. See O'Hagan, 521 U.S. at 653 ("We observe, first, that misappropriators .. .
deal in deception." (emphasis added)).
39. See id. at 654 ("Deception through nondisclosure is central to th[is] theory of
liability . . . ." (emphasis added)). According to the Court, the converse of this proposition is also true, as "full disclosure forecloses liability under the misappropriation
theory." Id. at 655.
40. Id. at 653 (quoting Brief for United States at 17, O'Hagan (No. 96-042)).
41. See id. at 655 n.6 ("[Tihe disclosure obligation runs to the source of the information . . . ." (emphasis added)). But see Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222,
240 (1980) (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (discussing an "absolute duty" of disclosure).
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Placing this formulation in the context of Rule 14e-3 and the
tender offer scenario, it is apparent why the Eighth Circuit, on
remand, determined James O'Hagan's trading activity to be
properly within this definition of misappropriation, and thus
within the scope of Rule 14e-3's prophylactic reach.42 Similarly,
it is now evident that this type of misappropriation is subject to
Rule 14e-3 liability. With this much established by O'Hagan, the
pertinent question becomes whether the O'Hagan-type of misappropriation'3 constitutes the outer limit of the legitimate scope of
Rule 14e-3, or whether Rule 14e-3's prophylactic nature allows it
to be extended legitimately to encompass tender offer trading
activity that, while based on nonpublic information, does not fit
cleanly into either the O'Hagan definition of misappropriation,'
or the O'Hagan-type misappropriation context.45
WAREHOUSING

Background
The practice of warehousing essentially involves "issuer-motivated tipping [of inside information regarding a future tender
offer for control of a corporate target] in advance of the offer to
place target stock in friendly hands before the offer commences."46 The practice of warehousing is ripe for post-O'HaganRule
14e-3 analysis for at least two distinct reasons. First, warehousing activity involves securities trading based on nonpublic information within the tender offer context, yet it entails significant
distinctions as compared to the O'Hagan-type misappropriation
tender offer activity.4' Second, the legitimacy of Rule 14e-3, as
42. See United States v. O'Hagan, 139 F.3d 641, 647-49 (8th Cir. 1998), on remand from 521 U.S. 642 (1997); see also Using High Court Guidelines, supra note
15, at 11-12 (analyzing the court's decision on remand).
43. This Note uses the phrase, "O'Hagan-type misappropriation" to describe the
specific factual situation in which James O'Hagan both acquired and used nonpublic
information regarding a tender offer.
44. See supra notes 35-41 and accompanying text (discussing the O'Hagan Court's
formulation of the term "misappropriation").
45. The remainder of this Note also assumes that the activity being analyzed does
not involve clear-cut insider trading based on traditional or common-law fraud.
46. Dennis, supra note 11, at 879 n.204.
47. See infra notes 58-73 and accompanying text.
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applied to the practice of warehousing, is an issue explicitly left
open and unresolved by the Court in O'Hagan.48 This suggests
that, at least potentially, the distinctions involved in the practice
of warehousing-vis-a-vis O'Hagan-type misappropriation-may
leave warehousing outside of the legitimate prophylactic scope of
Rule 14e-3. 49 If this is the case, delineating the distinctions that
may place warehousing outside of Rule 14e-3's legitimate reach
will provide valuable insight toward a more lucid understanding
of the proper prophylactic scope of Rule 14e-3.
Warehousing activity, as defined in O'Hagan, involves "the
practice by which bidders leak advance information of a tender
offer to allies and encourage them to purchase the target company's stock before the bid is [publicly] announced."50 For one or
more of several potential reasons, plans to initiate a tender offer
may be divulged deliberately by the bidder-sometimes to
friends or family, but more often to business allies-well before
an actual tender offer has been publicly announced and
launched.5 ' The practical effect of leaking inside information
about a tender offer is to allow the recipient of the information

48. See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
49. Interestingly, although the Court in O'Hagan left unresolved the issue of Rule
14e-3's legitimacy as applied to warehousing, the Court in Chiarella v. United States,
445 U.S. 222 (1980), made specific reference to the SEC's intent in promulgating
Rule 14e-3 to bar the practice of warehousing. See id. 234.
50. United States v. O'Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 672 n.17 (1997) (quoting Government
Reply Brief at 17, O'Hagan (No. 96-842)).
51. Although deliberate dissemination of nonpublic information regarding plans to
initiate a tender offer often occurs for personal reasons, more often-and more significantly in terms of impact upon the market-business purposes provide the ultimate
motivation. For example, a corporation planning a tender offer may tip large institutional investors, such as the managers of mutual or pension funds, with the expectation that these managers will purchase large blocks of the target stock at market
price, and then quickly tender the shares to the bidder once the tender offer has
been announced publicly. See generally William J. Carney, Signalling and Causation
in Insider Trading, 36 CATH. U. L. REv. 863, 893 (1987) (describing the general procedure followed in a tipping situation); Helen A. Garten, Insider Trading in the Corporate Interest, 1987 WIS. L. REV. 573, 606-07, 630 (discussing the "good will" explanation of a corporate insider's motivation for tipping of information to certain investors although receiving no apparent tangible personal or corporate benefit); Cook,
supra note 11, at 184 n.84 (defining warehousing as a means by which investors can
purchase stock in a target company before stock prices rise); Voves, supra note 12,
at 1043-45 (discussing the insider's rationale for tipping).
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to purchase securities of the target company at a market price
below-often substantially below-the value of the very same securities upon public initiation of the tender offer.52
A simplified example may help to illustrate the practice of
warehousing. Corporation B, the bidder, is planning to initiate a
tender offer for the common stock, and thus control, of Corporation T, the target.53 The common stock of Corporation T is trading on the market at ten dollars per share. Corporation B has
determined that it will initiate a tender offer, for all outstanding
shares of common stock of Corporation T, at a price of twenty
dollars per share; additionally, Corporation B internally has determined that, if necessary, it will be willing to increase this
offer up to thirty dollars per share.
Before Corporation B has disclosed its plans regarding the
impending tender offer to anyone outside of the company's directors and officers, it summons person P to its corporate offices. P
manages a large mutual fund. After disclosing its plans to initiate a tender offer for Corporation T, Corporation B makes absolutely clear to P that it does not, and will not, in any way object
to P using this nonpublic information, of which it alone is the
source, as a basis for acquiring securities of Corporation T on
the open market.5 4 At this time, no one associated with Corporation T, including its shareholders, is aware of Corporation B's
plans. Immediately upon receiving the information from Corporation B, P purchases common stock of Corporation T at the prevailing market price of ten dollars per share. Acquired through a

52. The share offering price is set above the market price by the bidder to account for the value of control over the target company the bidder seeks to acquire.
See Voves, supra note 12, at 1015, n.3; see also HAMILTON, supra note 7, at 1139
(defining share offering price).
53. Obviously, the driving force behind initiation of a tender offer is a perceived
opportunity to make money. See Richard A. Booth, The Efficient Market, Portfolio
Theory, and the Downward Sloping Demand Hypothesis, 68 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1187,
1191 n.6 (1993) ("A bidder would not make a bid for a target company unless it was
expected to be profitable."). Theoretically, profitability will result from establishing a
tender offer bid price for an amount somewhat less than what the bidder expects to

realize upon obtaining control of the target corporation by either instituting operational changes or selling off assets. See id.
54. In fact, the more likely scenario involves Corporation B actively encouraging P
to purchase shares of Corporation T. See supra note 51 and accompanying text.
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broker on the open market, P has no feasible way to know, or
learn, the identity of any of the sellers from which the Corporation T common stock has been acquired.
Three weeks later, Corporation B makes public its initiation
of a tender offer for the stock of Corporation T at a price of
twenty dollars per share.55 In response to this public announcement, the market price for shares of Corporation T rises.56 Several weeks after the announcement, Corporation B completes the
tender offer by accepting the submitted shares of Corporation T
common stock and tendering twenty dollars per share to all who
submitted stock. P is among those who tender stock to Corporation B; the mutual fund that P manages profits by ten dollars
per share of Corporation T common stock. Throughout this entire process, Corporation B has received no direct pecuniary
benefit as a result of its "tipping" of its own nonpublic information to p.5 7
Although oversimplified, this basic scenario serves as an adequate foundation for the following examination of the legitimacy
of Rule 14e-3 as applied to the practice of warehousing.
Warehousing and Misappropriation
The O'Hagan case teaches that securities trading in the context of a tender offer, which properly may be characterized as involving misappropriation of nonpublic information, even without
an element of common-law fraud, will nonetheless fall within

55. Once a corporation announces a tender offer, rather than accepting shares directly, a bidder appoints a "depository" that accepts and accounts for the tendered
shares on behalf of the bidder. See James R. Pagano, Note, The Constitutionality of
Second Generation Takeover Statutes, 73 VA. L. REV. 203, 203 n.1 (1987) (discussing
the mechanics of tender offers).
56. The market price typically will approach the established tender offer value-in
this case, $20. Any market discrepancy in value represents the risk, as perceived by
the market, that the tender offer will fail. For a more detailed and technical analysis of the dynamics of the relationship between the market price and the tender offer price of a security, focusing particularly on the role of risk arbitrage, see Dennis,
supra note 11, at 846-50.
57. This is not to suggest, however, that all meaningful benefit necessarily must
be pecuniary in nature. See Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 663-64 (1983) (noting that
the benefit requirement also includes tips offered as a gift); Voves, supra note 12, at
1028 n.28.
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the legitimate prophylactic scope of Rule 14e-3.5 8 If, by examining the warehousing practice, a sufficiently correlative relationship can be established between warehousing activity and
the activity that occurred in O'Hagan,59 it follows that proscription of warehousing must be deemed a legitimate function of
Rule 14e-3. 60 That such a correlative relationship does not in
fact exist becomes evident through a comparison between the
O'Hagan-type misappropriation trading activity and the warehousing scenario delineated above.
Recall the elements of securities trading misappropriation
highlighted by the Court in O'Hagan: deception through nondisclosure to the source of the nonpublic information.6 1 With these
elements in mind, reconsider the warehousing scenario developed above.6 2 The nature of the deception involved in the warehousing scenario, if any exists at all,6 s clearly is distinct from
the nature of the deception addressed by the Court in
O'Hagan.64 In the warehousing scenario, P's role in the acquisition of the nonpublic information was entirely passive, 65 and P's
use of the information as the basis for trading was not only
known to the source of the inside information, but was in fact
encouraged by the bidding corporation.66
58. See United States v. O'Hagan 521 U.S. 642, 676-77 (1997). This notion has
been applied recently in SEC v. Mayhew, 121 F.3d 44, 50-53 (2d Cir. 1997).
59. See Voves, supra note 12, at 1045-47 (discussing "misappropriation theory"
under section 14(e)).
60. To a certain extent, of course, this begs the question of exactly what constitutes a "sufficient" correlative relationship, an issue that a subsequent section of this
Note addresses.
61. See supra notes 38-41 and accompanying text.
62. See supra notes 53-57 and accompanying text.
63. The nature of deception within the practice of warehousing will be more thoroughly examined below. See infra notes 88-124 and accompanying text. For present
purposes, it suffices simply to note that the nature and extent of the deception involved in both the acquisition and the use of the nonpublic information in the
O'Hagan-type misappropriation situation is markedly distinct from the nature and
extent of the acquisition and use of nonpublic information in the warehousing scenario.
64. See United States v. O'Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 653-54 (1997); see also supra
notes 38-41 and accompanying text (discussing the meaning of "deception").
65. Some commentators view the manner in which the inside information is acquired, or the "means of discovery," as one method by which to distinguish fraudulent from nohfraudulent insider trading. See, e.g., Dalley, supra note 2, at 1329.
66. At least in regard to the trader and the principal, (or source of the nonpublic
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Similarly, the nature and extent of nondisclosure in the two
situations differ significantly. 7 This dissimilarity is linked directly to the distinct role played by the source of the nonpublic
information in each situation. In the O'Hagan misappropriation
case, not only was the public disclosure required by Rule 14e-3
absent, but additionally, and more significantly, no disclosure to
the source of the information occurred.68 Interestingly, it was
this latter type of nondisclosure that the Court focused on when
justifying Rule 14e-3's legitimate application to O'Hagan's activity. 9 This makes perfect sense, as nondisclosure to the source of
the nonpublic information was a central element leading to the
O'Hagan Court's conclusion that the securities trading involved
misappropriation, which in turn placed James O'Hagan's trading
activity within the legitimate prophylactic scope of Rule 14e-3.7 °

information) then, no deception has occurred.
67. Of course, as presently written, Rule 14e-3 requires disclosure to the public in
all situations involving nonpublic information concerning a tender offer, regardless
of the source, or the source's willingness to divulge such information. See 17 C.F.R.
§ 240.14e-3(a) (1998). Using this fact as a basis to avoid making the comparison between the nature and extent of nondisclosure in O'Hagan versus that exhibited in
the warehousing practice, however, first requires making the assumption that Rule
14e-3, as written, is entirely, and in all cases, legitimately within the authorized
scope of section 14(e) of the Exchange Act. It is the validity of this very assumption,
however, that this Note scrutinizes. Rather than being a moot exercise, the comparison of nondisclosure therefore becomes extremely meaningful.
68. This type of nondisclosure-nondisclosure to the source of the nonpublic information-is the heart of the misappropriation that the Court in O'Hagan ruled to be
within the prophylactic reach of Rule 14e-3. See O'Hagan, 521 U.S. at 675-76; see
also supra note 41 and accompanying text (discussing the Court's treatment of the
'source" of nonpublic information). But see infra note 70 (noting that in O'Hagan,
the Court's focus on nondisclosure to the source did not preclude it from finding that
Rule 14e-3's general public disclosure requirement is valid).
69. See O'Hagan, 521 U.S. at 654-55 (focusing on the role of deception within nondisclosure to the source of the nonpublic information).
70. It is worth mentioning again that the Court's focus on the nondisclosure to
the source of the nonpublic information in O'Hagan in no way precluded it from determining that Rule 14e-3's more general public disclosure requirement was in fact
valid. See supra note 37 and accompanying text (discussing the relation between the
Court's Rule 10b-5 and Rule 14e-3 misappropriation analyses). The Court's opinion in
O'Hagan did not address the validity of public disclosure because it had no need to
do so; by focusing on James O'Hagan's misappropriation of nonpublic information
from the information's source, the Court avoided any in-depth analysis beyond the
specific facts at hand. See O'Hagan, 521 U.S. at 673 n.17 ("The instant case . . .
does not involve trading authorized by a principal; therefore, we need not here decide
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In contrast, the only nondisclosure occurring in O'Hagan that
also appears in the warehousing scenario is P's failure to make
a public disclosure as required explicitly by the terms of Rule
14e-3. 1
In the warehousing example, the notion of P making a disclosure to the source, Corporation B, is moot, as Corporation B
leaked the nonpublic information to P for the specific purpose of
encouraging and allowing P to initiate trading based on the information. Whether the lack of nondisclosure to the sburce of the
inside information in the warehousing scenario is a fact sufficient to remove the activity from the legitimate scope of Rule
14e-3 is addressed below. 2 For present purposes, in light of the
Court's focus on nondisclosure to the source as an element of
O'Hagan-type misappropriation, the lack of nondisclosure to the
source within the warehousing scenario simply furthers the distinction between the two types of securities trading within the
tender offer context. The possibility that the practice of warehousing may escape the legitimate prophylactic reach of Rule
14e-3 as shaped by the Court's decision in O'Hagan therefore
remains open.73

WAREHOUSING: OUTSIDE THE PROPHYLACTIC SCOPE
OF RULE 14e-3?
The remainder of this Note, by focusing on the legitimacy of
proscription of the practice of warehousing under Rule 14e-3,
attempts to demarcate the limit of Rule 14e-3's valid prophylactic reach, in light of its authority under section 14(e) of the
Exchange Act.

whether the [SECI's proscription of warehousing falls within its § 14(e) authority to
define or prevent fraud.") (emphasis added).
71. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.14e-3(a).
72. See infra notes 74-124 and accompanying text.
73. The "possibility" raised here involves the analytical state of Rule 14e-3 as applied to warehousing, the legal state, of course, has been addressed previously. See
supra notes 8-9 and accompanying text.
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Exchange Act Section 14(e) Revisited
Section 14(e) of the Exchange Act, 74 which deals exclusively
with the trading of securities within the tender offer context,
authorizes the SEC as follows: "The Commission shall, for the
purposes of this subsection, by rules and regulations define, and
prescribe means reasonably designed to prevent, such acts and
practices as are fraudulent, deceptive, or manipulative."

5

In

evaluating the legitimacy of SEC rules issued pursuant to section 14(e)'s authorization, the Supreme Court consistently has
focused on the phrase "means reasonably designed to prevent"
fraud. 76 As noted previously," the Court has interpreted this
phrase to authorize SEC prohibition not only of the "core" activity, namely fraud,7" but also of sufficiently related activity that,
although not necessarily fraudulent, nonetheless falls within the
prophylactic scope of a rule "reasonably designed" to prevent the
core activity.79
Applied specifically to Rule 14e-3, the Court's interpretation of
section 14(e)'s authorization restricts the SEC to legitimate prohibition of tender offer trading activity that either (a) is itself
fraudulent, or (b) is perceived to be so similarly related to fraud74. 15 U.S.C. § 78n(e) (1994).
75. Id. In its entirety, section 14(e) reads:
It shall be unlawful for any person to make any untrue statement of a
material fact or omit to state any material fact necessary in order to
make the statements made, in the light of the circumstances under
which they are made, not misleading, or to engage in any fraudulent,
deceptive, or manipulative acts or practices, in connection with any tender offer or request or invitation for tenders, or any solicitation of security holders in opposition to or in favor of any such offer, request, or invitation. The Commission shall, for the purposes of this subsection, by
rules and regulations define, and prescribe means reasonably designed to
prevent, such acts and practices as are fraudulent, deceptive, or manipulative.
Id.
76. See, e.g., United States v. OHagan, 521 U.S. 642, 673 (1997); Schreiber v.
Burlington N., Inc., 472 U.S. 1, 11 n.11 (1985).
77. See supra notes 30-31 and accompanying text.
78. The Court has interpreted the section 14(e) terms "fraudulent," "deceptive,"
and "manipulative" as possessing the identical meaning. See Schreiber, 472 U.S. at
8; Voves, supra note 12, at 1019 n.21.
79. See O'Hagan, 521 U.S. at 673; see also supra note 75 and accompanying text
(reciting mandate of section 14(e)).
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ulent activity as to render its prohibition necessary to ensure
compliance and allow for effective enforcement of the rule."° In
effect, the O'Hagan Court's inclusion of "akin to fraud" situations within the legitimate scope of Rule 14e-3 acknowledges the
practical necessity for some degree of a prophylactic safety-net
as the means for enabling the SEC to achieve the ends Congress
intended in its enactment of section 14(e). l
There must, however, be some limit to the legitimate reach of
the prophylactic safety-net embodied in Rule 14e-3. Eventually,
the Court will have to determine exactly what type of tender
offer trading activity-beyond misappropriation-that although
nonfraudulent, must nonetheless be proscribed so as to ensure
that the prohibition of section 14(e) "core" activity may be enforced adequately. Having learned from O'Hagan that Rule 14e3's prophylactic scope legitimately prohibits misappropriation of
nonpublic information, 82 a further determination of the rule's
legitimate scope, in turn, revolves around an analysis of the
practice of warehousing.
Legitimacy Considerations: Rule
Warehousing

14e-3"s Extension to

As illustrated previously, the practice of warehousing within
the context of a tender offer is distinguishable in several ways
from the misappropriation scenario in O'Hagan.8" It seems clear
from the warehousing model developed above" that warehousing
involves neither the nature nor the extent of "deceptive nondis8 5 This determination,
closure to the source" targeted in O'Hagan.
although necessary, is, however, by no means sufficient to
support the conclusion that the prohibition of warehousing is

80. See O'Hagan, 521 U.S. at 674-75; see also supra note 30 (discussing difficulties
in enforcement).
81. See O'Hagan, 521 U.S. at 674-75.
82. See supra notes 15-19 and accompanying text.
83. See supra notes 61-73 and accompanying text (comparing the practice of
warehousing in the context of a tender offer with O'Hagan-type misappropriation).
84. See supra notes 53-57 and accompanying text.
85. See supra notes 35-45 and accompanying text (discussing the O'Hagan Court's
use of the term "misappropriation" in the context of Rule 14e-3); see also O'Hagan,
521 U.S. at 650-77 (discussing nondisclosure as defined by Rule 14e-3).
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beyond the legitimate prophylactic scope of Rule 14e-3 as authorized by section 14(e).
Sufficient support, it seems, may be drawn only from an additional determination of the extent to which the Court's rationale
undergirding its decision to apply Rule 14e-3 to O'Hagan-type
misappropriation logically can be carried over to the warehousing scenario. The context of this analysis can be summarized as
follows: As applied to the nature and extent of both deception
and nondisclosure inherent in warehousing activity, is the prohibition of warehousing under Rule 14e-3 valid given section
14(e)'s limitation of "means reasonably designed to prevent...
acts and practices" that are "fraudulent"?" More specifically:
How does the nature and extent of deception and nondisclosure
inherent in warehousing activity implicate the traditional policy
concerns of fairness and market integrity that surround insider
trading law?8 7

86. See supra note 75 and accompanying text (reciting authorization language of
section 14(e)).
87. See generally Swanson, supra note 3, at 1159-60 (discussing the policy concerns inherent in insider trading law). This Note does not deal with a third concern,
market efficiency, as it does not directly implicate fraud, deception, or nondisclosure.
Market efficiency, however, is an interesting and often controversial aspect of insider
trading law and policy. See generally Dennis W. Carlton & Daniel R. Fischel, The
Regulation of Insider Trading, 35 STAN. L. REV. 857, 866-72 (1983) (arguing that
insider trading may be desirable based on market efficiency goals); Boyd Kimball
Dyer, Economic Analysis, Insider Trading, and Game Markets, 1992 UTAH L. REv. 1,
11-66 (exploring economic arguments supporting the prohibition against insider trading); Swanson, supra note 3, at 1206 ("Economists advance a convincing case that
insider trading in fact enhances market efficiency, negating the need for any prohibition. Even if the efficiency argument were only marginal, the enforcement costs
would tip the balance away from regulation.").
Not all commentators, however, agree that insider trading necessarily creates
market efficiency, and still others believe the efficiency of insider trading to be an
irrelevant consideration. See Marcel Kahan, Securities Laws and the Social Costs of
"Inaccurate" Stock Prices, 1992 DuKE L.J. 977, 1003 (noting that a repeal of the
insider trading prohibition would have little effect in reducing market volatility);
Olson et al., supra note 35, at 227-29; Roy A. Schotland, Unsafe at Any Price: A
Reply to Manne, Insider Trading and the Stock Market, 53 VA. L. REV. 1425, 1439
(1967) ("Even if...
unfettered insider trading would bring an economic gain, we
might still forego that gain in order to secure a stock market . . . that satisflies]
such noneconomic goals as fairness, just rewards and integrity.").
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Warehousing: Deception and Nondisclosure, Fairness, and
Market Integrity
As mentioned above, simply making the determination that
warehousing is distinct from O'Hagan-type misappropriation is
insufficient to support a claim that warehousing must therefore
fall outside of the legitimate prophylactic scope of Rule 14e-3.88
The differences between the two activities, however, are helpful
in highlighting the overriding concerns that support section
14(e), as well as Rule 14e-3 and its expansive prophylactic
scope. 9 By analyzing- the distinctions delineated above, under
the interrelated notions of fairness and market integrity,90 this
Note argues that the practice of warehousing does not implicate
either of these concerns to an extent sufficient to fall within
Rule 14e-3's prophylactic scope, as authorized by section 14(e)
and interpreted by the Court in O'Hagan.
Within the following analysis, it is essential to understand
that this Note does not presume that negative issues surrounding fairness and market integrity are absent in the warehousing
context. This discussion instead focuses on the nature and extent of deception and nondisclosure exhibited in the warehousing practice and asks whether it is sufficient to justify warehousing's legitimate prohibition under Rule 14e-3, in light of the
concerns of fairness and market integrity, and given the Court's
opinion in O'Hagan.

88. See supra notes 58-73 and accompanying text (discussing warehousing and
misappropriation).
89. See supra notes 30-31 and accompanying text (discussing the necessity of Rule
14e-3's prophylactic reach); see also supra note 87 and accompanying text (discussing
"fairness" and "market efficiency").
90. For an excellent and readily understandable analysis of the notions of fairness
and integrity as they relate specifically to the various antifraud provisions of the
Exchange Act, see Olson et al., supra note 35, at 226-29. Numerous other, more indepth treatments of the subject exist, as evidenced by the observation by one commentator that "m]any forests have been destroyed in the quest to understand and
explain the law of insider trading." Lawrence E. Mitchell, The Jurisprudenceof the
MisappropriationTheory and the New Insider Trading Legislation: From Fairness to
Efficiency and Back, 52 ALB. L. REV. 775, 775 (1988).
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Fairness
The Court's concern with deception and nondisclosure in
O'Hagan can be justified as an extension of the more fundamental concern of fairness. 1 That misappropriation of nonpublic information, leading to tender offer trading activity, implicates
fairness seems obvious. Following the Court's decision in
O'Hagan, it also seems clear that misappropriation, an activity
short of actual fraud, can be so unfair as to fall under the prophylactic arm of Rule 14e-3. 92 This conclusion, however, begs the
question: What makes a particular nonfraudulent trading activity so unfair as to allow for its prohibition under a tender offer
insider trading provision
that speaks only of the prohibition of
93
fraudulent activity?

Fairness, though nearly always mentioned in a treatment of
insider trading law,94 is an extremely elusive concept to define,
leading one commentator simply to refer to the notion as "gutreaction fairness."95 One certainty, however, is that a meaningful

91. It is important to note that "fairness," as used within this discussion, is necessarily distinct from the issue of "fraud." In examining the prophylactic scope of Rule
14e-3, traditional or common-law fraud is no longer at issue; rather, it is the more
elusive determination of fairness that drives the purely prophylactic arm of Rule
14e-3. See generally Cook, supra note 11, at 204-06 (discussing the fairness rationale
in the context of Rule 14e-3).
92. See supra notes 30-31 and accompanying text.
93. See supra note 75 and accompanying text (reciting section 14(e)); see also supra note 78 (noting the definitional equivalence of the terms "fraudulent," "deceptive," and "manipulative").
94. See, e.g., Carlton & Fischel, supra note 87, at 880-82 (discussing fairness arguments); Dalley, supra note 2, at 1339-43 (considering fairness and standards of the
business community); Jill E. Fisch, Start Making Sense: An Analysis and Proposal
for Insider Trading Regulation, 26 GA. L. REv. 179, 219-26 (1991) (discussing fairness as a basis for insider trading prohibitions); Salbu, supra note 4, at 249 (noting
fairness arguments); Kim Lane Scheppele, 'It's Just Not Right": The Ethics of Insider
Trading, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Summer 1993, at 123, 160-63 (arguing in favor
of the need for a level playing field); Cook, supra note 11, at 204-06 (discussing the
fairness theory behind the ban on insider trading); David A. Wilson, Note and Comment, Outsider Trading-Morality and the Law of Securities Fraud, 77 GEO. L.J.
181, 212-16 (1988) (detailing the "fair play obligation").
95. Swanson, supra note 3, at 1210. Another commentator illustrates the notion of
fairness within insider trading by relating it to the popular mentality that "[tihe
successful inside trader has won the lottery without buying a ticket." Fisch, supra
note 94, at 233.
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evaluation of fairness in the field of securities regulation must
involve an assessment of an activity's equity in reference to
some individual or group, most importantly the party or parties
impacted by that activity, rather than being based purely upon
metaphysical theory.9 6
The fairness issue evaluated by the Court in O'Hagan involved fairness to the corporate source of the inside information.9" The essence of the misappropriation theory is that it is
unfair-an inequity nearing fraudulence-for an investor,
through deceptive nondisclosure to the source, to profit from inside information intended solely for a corporate purpose.9 " This
type of unfairness does not exist in the warehousing scenario,
however, in which the tipping of inside information involves no
deception to the corporation, and in fact serves the corporate
purpose.9 9 This level of inequity, then, cannot be carried over
from the O'Hagan-type of tender offer trading activity to warehousing.
The question that remains is whether the practice of warehousing implicates unfairness vis-a-vis another party; in this
case, the other party could only be the selling shareholders of
the target corporation. In the warehousing context, determining
if deception occurs as a result of the trader failing to reveal
nonpublic information is central to the evaluation of warehousing and its relationship to both fairness and market integrity.
The very method by which the securities markets function, however, creates a situation in which pinpointing any specific deception is impractical, if not impossible." °

96. See Fisch, supra note 94, at 220-21 (noting that an inequality of information,
whether resulting in direct or indirect harm, is the basis of the fairness argument).
97. See supra note 41 and accompanying text.
98. See supra note 40 and accompanying text.
99. See supra note 51 and accompanying text.

100. See SEC v. Jakubowski, 150 F.3d 675, 679-80 (7th Cir. 1998) (Easterbrook, J.)
(analyzing the Courfs decision in O'Hagan by stating that [a]lthough O'Hagan had
private information about the future price of the stock, he did not deceive the invesOHagan's actions wronged the bidder, not
tors by trading at the market price ....
the persons from whom he bought stock . . . ." (emphasis added)); Dailey, supra
fact that insider trading occurs primarily in an impersonal
note 2, at 1349 ("e
market is probably most significant in that it makes the ignorant trader's loss diffi-

cult to identify.").
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The securities markets operate in an anonymous manner; as
11
such, traders do not typically carry out face-to-face bargaining.
In fact, in the typical market transaction, no bargaining takes
place at all.0 2 Traders make decisions to purchase securities at a
certain price, and decisions to sell securities at the same price,
completely independent of one another. Within the securities
markets, the motivation to buy or sell at any given price is
unique to each individual trader, and thus traders make individual trading judgments quite apart from any concept of deception
or unfairness.' Perhaps, then, the unfairness within warehousing can be viewed as against a much larger party in interest;
namely, the market in general, and its participating investors.
Under these circumstances, the notion of fairness is addressed
more properly under the related notions of market integrity and
equality of information.
Market Integrity
A related manner in which to view the notion of fairness involves equating fairness with "assuring market integrity so that
the average investor will have the confidence to participate."1c 4
The market integrity argument emanates from the notion that
permitting traders with inside information to participate in market trades, when other traders lack the same nonpublic information, essentially creates a "rigged" situation that, by undermining public confidence in the capital markets, will drive ordinary
investors away from future participation.0 5 To the extent that
the equity, or the lack thereof, involved in this notion is equated

101. See Dailey, supra note 2, at 1347-51 (discussing the characteristics of the
"Impersonal Stock Market").
102. See Scheppele, supra note 94, at 138 ("[B]uyers and sellers are not present [in
market trades] as concrete individuals with complex particular understandings about
the terms of the sale; they are abstracted entities who respond only to the terms of
the market-price predominantly . . . ." (emphasis added)).
103. See id.; Stephanie F. Barkholz, Comment, Insider Trading, the Contemporaneous Trader, and the Corporate Acquirer: Entitlement to Profits Disgorged by the SEC,
40 EMORY L.J. 537, 546-56 (1991) (discussing the rights of contemporaneous traders
to recover profits and concluding that there is no causal connection that would allow
recovery).
104. Swanson, supra note 3, at 1206.
105. See Carlton & Fischel, supra note 87, at 858; Swanson, supra note 3, at 1161.
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with informational egalitarianism," 6 it is unattainable and unrealistic outside of a theoretical vacuum, given the informational
advantages that many market participants and investors already possess." 7 Once the government and the courts tolerate
some inequality of investor information, the equality of information theory'1 8 carries little weight as the basis for establishing
the inequity of utilizing insider information."l 9 Additionally, one
hardly can argue that investors presently are unaware of the
existence of insider trading, negating the claim that investors
are being exploited unknowingly."' Thus the fact that some investors may possess more information than others, although potentially unfair in some sense of the word, does not create a situation in which fraud and deception are inherent within the securities market."1
Scholars have argued that the deception involved in the use of
inside information can be highlighted best, not by following an
equality of information model, but rather by employing an

106. Informational egalitarianism assumes all traders have an equal amount of
market information. See Swanson, supra note 3, at 1161-62.
107. See id. Market professionals, in particular, make a living by conducting extensive in-house research, and by acquiring, often through established corporate insider
contacts, information that few ordinary market investors are able to obtain. See L.
Gordon Crovitz, With 'Insider Trading,' It's Conviction First-DefinitionLater, WALL
ST. J., May 9, 1990, at A15 (noting that "[florced equality of information is an odd
idea in an industry with legions of analysts paid to ferret out information and
where Moms and Pops pay mutual funds to watch markets for them").
The disparity of access to and amount of available information is especially evident in the search for potential corporate targets and takeovers. See generally James
Harlan Koenig, Comment, The Basics of Disclosure: The Market for Information in
the Market for Corporate Control, 43 U. MrAMI L. REV. 1021, 1027-38 (1989) (discussing information available in the context of corporate mergers and acquisitions).
108. The Supreme Court has noted that "neither the Congress nor the [SEC] ever
has adopted a parity-of-information rule." United States v. Chiarella, 445 U.S. 222,
233 (1980).
109. See Garten, supra note 51, at 612.
110. See Carlton & Fischel, supra note 87, at 879-80 (discussing the reasons uninformed traders trade in the stock market); see also Barkholz, supra note 103, at 567
("Incomplete information is a constant 'risk' in the market, and its possible harm to
the trader is present even in the absence of insider trading."); Haskell, supra note
19, at 243 ("[A] parity-of-information rule does little to affect the confidences of investors as reflected in their investment practices.").
111. See Barkholz, supra note 103, at 567 (concluding that the harm caused by unequal information is a risk of trading even without insider trading).
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equality of access to information model." This notion is based
on a view of fairness that seeks to achieve a general consent to
established rules under which the benefits and losses of securities trading will take place."1 Under this theory, an investor
who trades on inside information offends these established rules
because other investors, who have no possibility of obtaining the
identical information, would not consent to the trading activity." Although this distinction may enable a more lucid determination as to the theoretical equity of insider trading transactions
to be made, the following illustration will show that the distinction is meaningless, at least within the context of market integrity, and specifically as it pertains to warehousing.
In the case of a tender offer, pre-initiation increases of the
securities price of the target corporation often can be attributed
to legitimate information searches, as well as to exploitations of
leaks,"' or direct divulgence of inside information. 116 To the sell-

er of securities, who cannot feasibly know either the purchaser
or the purchaser's rationale for purchasing on the open market,"' it is irrelevant whether the purchaser chooses to buy certain securities at a certain price based upon research, a hunch,
or a tip from the inside." 8 Additionally, we cannot logically conclude that the tippee is, in effect, "stealing" part of the return in
market value from traders who have made a unilateral decision
to sell, especially in light of the fact that what the seller is actually losing, if anything, is merely the potential of a takeover premium." 9 Even when that potential is of significant magnitude, it
112. See Scheppele, supra note 94, at 125 (explaining why fiduciary obligation analysis is insufficient to decide insider trading cases).
113. See id. at 155 (discussing the contractarian approach to obligations between
trading partners).
114. See id. at 162-63 (explaining how the moral concept of equal access to information justifies rules on insider trading).
115. See Pitt et al., supra note 3, at 75 (noting that "[despite everyone's best efforts, putative tender offers often become the source of marketplace rumors").
116. See Salbu, supra note 4, at 234-35.
117. See supra notes 100-02 and accompanying text.
118. See Fisch, supra note 94, at 197 (observing that "stockholders who decided
contemporaneously to sell did so based on extraneous factors . . . [making] a decision they would have made even if the insiders had stayed out of the market").
119. The premium is merely potential because there is no guarantee that a tender
offer actually will be initiated; furthermore, even once initiated, the tender offer may
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is essential to recall that the seller has in no way been forced,
by deception or otherwise, to sell; an investor in this situation
always possesses the option of simply not trading."' Ultimately,
market integrity relies on the absence of fraud and deception;...
the integrity of the securities markets cannot be predicated on
the absence and elimination of all access to information, including warehousing, deemed merely unfair. 2
Although the warehousing situation described above likely
creates a sense that something unfair is taking place, it is quite
a different story to determine that either a fraudulent activity or
a deceptive act prohibited by post-O'Hagan Rule 14e-3 has occurred. To accept that the practice of warehousing legitimately
violates the mandate of section 14(e), one must first conclude
that the unfairness within warehousing trading activity implicates an inequity against the market in general that rises, at a
minimum, to the level of O'Hagan-type misappropriation, and
thus that market integrity is at stake.m The Court in O'Hagan,
however, emphasized that the activity being prevented under
the mandate of section 14(e) is fraud or misappropriation on the
source of the nonpublic information.' 24 Within the practice of
warehousing, the degree of unfairness involved simply does not
rise even to O'Hagan-type levels.
SECTION 14(e): THE ROLE OF THE COURT AND THE CONGRESS

"The history of the rule against insider trading has been a
search for a legal theory to justify why conduct that is wrong is
fail, or be revoked by the bidder.
120. See Nicholas L. Georgakopoulos, Insider Trading as a Transactional Cost: A
Market Micro Structure Justification and Optimization of Insider Trading Regulation,
26 CONN. L. REV. 1, 17 (1993) (stating that uninformed .traders can avoid having informed traders "take" stock market returns simply by not trading).
121. "Deception" here means the type exhibited in O'Hagan. See supra notes 38-41
and accompanying text.
122. See Scheppele, supra note 94, at 125.
123. This, of course, is the opposite of the conclusion just reached. See supra notes
91-122 and accompanying text.
124. See supra note 41 and accompanying text; see also Pitt et al., supra note 3, at
77 (interpreting the O'Hagan decision as standing for the proposition that "a defendant deceives nobody and is not subject to liability if the insider trading has been
disclosed to a principal and consent was obtained").
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also illegal."' 25 Applied to the specific context of the tender offer,
and even more specifically to the practice of warehousing, this
quotation directly addresses the tension surrounding much of
the debate over Rule 14e-3 in the wake of the O'Hagan decision.
As for the fairness justification, and the related justification of
market integrity, this Note maintains that not all inappropriate,
or even immoral, activity need necessarily be equated legally
with fraud or even O'Hagan-type misappropriation. 6 Ethical
considerations may be made apart from legal conclusions. Perhaps lost in much of the discussion is the specific goal of section
14(e) as interpreted by the Court in O'Hagan; the activity being
proscribed within the tender offer context by Rule 14e-3 is
fraudulent activity, and those activitiesso akin to fraud as to fall
within Rule 14e-3"s prophylactic reach.2 As is true of all other
areas of the law, but especially within the controversial realm of
insider trading, it is worth another reminder that not all unethical or unfair activity necessarily is unlawful, fraudulent, or, in
of Rule 14e-3, even within the relevant scope of
the situation
128
fraud.

In the future, the role of the Court, in evaluating the practice
of warehousing, will be to view the activity within the framework of section 14(e)'s authorizing provision, in light of the prophylactic scope of Rule 14e-3 as interpreted in O'Hagan. In addition, it is important to remember that, ultimately, section 14(e)
deals with the prevention of fraud according to the framework
established by Congress. 29 Based on the Court's analysis of activity legitimately prohibited by Rule 14e-3 and its prophylactic
extension, 30 and in light of the significant distinctions between
O'Hagan-type misappropriation and warehousing, 131 it is neither
125. Garten, supra note 51, at 612.
126. See supra text accompanying note 82; see also United States v. O'Hagan, 92
F.3d 612, 628 (8th Cir. 1996), rev'd, 521 U.S. 642 (1997) (noting that "it is a fundamental principle of the criminal law that not every ethical or moral transgression
falls within its realm").
127. See supra notes 30-31 and accompanying text.
128. See supra notes 91-92 and accompanying text (noting that "fairness" is distinct
from common-law fraud in the Rule 14e-3 context).
129. See supra note 75 and accompanying text.
130. See supra notes 30-31 and accompanying text.
131. See generally supra notes 58-124 and accompanying text (discussing the corre-
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logical nor proper for the Court to place warehousing activity
within the same prophylactic scope. It is not the domain of the
judiciary to make determinations concerning the point at which
unfair activity becomes legally fraudulent; a policy determination of this nature is best left to Congress. 3 2 By ruling that
warehousing is not properly proscribed by Rule 14e-3 under section 14(e), the Court effectively will defer this critical policy determination to Congress, which, if so inclined, may enact more
specific legislation targeting the type of nonfraudulent
tender
1 s
offer trading activity that occurs in warehousing.
CONCLUSION

In United States v. O'Hagan, the Supreme Court sustained
the validity of SEC Rule 14e-3 by focusing on the rule's prophylactic nature. By failing to delineate clearly the limits of Rule
14e-3's prophylactic scope, however, the Court left unresolved
questions concerning the legitimacy of the rule as applied to the
practice of warehousing. By concentrating on the limiting language used by the Court in its Rule 14e-3 analysis in O'Hagan,
examining the specific use of the term "misappropriation" within
the Rule 10b-5 context, and applying the O'Hagan principles of
misappropriation to Rule 14e-3, this Note has established several significant distinctions between the tender offer trading activity exhibited in O'Hagan and the tender offer trading activity
involved in the practice of warehousing.
By exploring these distinctions-most significantly the nature
and extent of deception through nondisclosure to the source of
the nonpublic information-under the notions of fairness, market integrity, and equality of information, this Note, in light of
section 14(e)'s mandate to prevent fraudulent acts, concludes

lation between warehousing and misappropriation).
132. See Painter et al., supra note 3, at 211-18 (arguing for Congress or the SEC

to define when it is illegal to trade on the basis of material, nonpublic information).
133. See Fisch, supra note 94, at 228-35 (discussing the political reasons behind
insider trading laws); Swanson, supra note 3, at 1208 (stating that if Bryan and
O'Hagan were the law today, the government would urge Congress "for more specific
legislation"); Jonathan E.A. ten Oever, Case Note, Insider Trading and the Dual Role
of Information, 106 YALE L.J. 1325, 1328-30 (1997) (arguing for congressional enactment of legislation based upon the recognition of the "dual role" of information).
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that the prophylactic reach of SEC Rule 14e-3 should not legitimately prohibit warehousing. Put succinctly, not only is warehousing distinct from misappropriation in several key aspects,
but additionally the type of unfairness involved in the practice of
warehousing simply does not rise to the level legitimately prohibited under Rule 14e-3's prophylactic scope.
Jeff Lobb

